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Against Centralization
GERALD E. FRUGt

There is much to admire in Georgette Poindexter's
Beyond the Urban-SuburbanDichotomy.' Poindexter rightly
emphasizes how poor many American suburbs are, and
insightfully demonstrates the special nature of the
problems of concentrated poverty in suburban rather than
central city locations. But when she turns to her
suggestions about what to do about the current
concentration of poverty in America, she seems to embrace
a vision that is common among urban scholars. One
ingredient in that vision is centralization: only the exercise
of state and federal power or regional government, these
scholars suggest, can redirect America's urban policy in a
way that can improve the lives of the poor. A second
ingredient is the kind of urban policy they want centralized
government to adopt: they imagine the creation of programs
specifically targeted at the problems facing America's poor.
We have seen this vision before; it is 1960s-style
liberalism. The Great Society, one should recall, was an
effort to mobilize the power of centralized government (in
particular, the power of the federal government) to win the
war Lyndon Johnson had declared against poverty. Since I
myself was a '60s liberal, I find much in this vision that
stirs the heart. But I think that it is high time that we
admit that this '60s strategy is not going to be
implemented. The era of big government, we have been
authoritatively told, is over. The war against poverty is over
too. If so, we need to reject both ingredients in the standard
vision: its reliance on centralization and its focus on
concentrated poverty.
Let us start with the embrace of centralization. Like
t Samuel R. Rosenthal Professor of Law, Harvard University.

1. Georgette Poindexter, Beyond the Urban-Suburban Dichotomy: A
Discussion of Sub-Regional Poverty and Concentration, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 67

(2000).
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many others, Poindexter presents centralization as the only
alternative to the current fragmentation of America's
metropolitan areas into dozens (often, hundreds) of
autonomous jurisdictions, each of which is empowered to
advance its own self-interest at the expense of its
neighbors.2 One form these writers see this centralization
taking is federal legislation: they rely on housing policies
adopted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development or on federal transportation policies like the
1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act.
Another is state government initiatives, such as the
establishment
of urban
growth
boundaries
and
environmental protection laws. Moreover, in the style of the
1960s, these scholars tend to think of centralization not just
in terms of federal and state legislation but also in the form
of federal and state court decisions. Poindexter cites with
approval, for example, efforts undertaken by a federal
district court in the late 1960s and early 1970s to place
public housing built for the African-American poor in the
suburbs, efforts upheld (with many qualifications) by the
United States Supreme Court.3 Still, the most popular form
of centralization that current writers now embrace is the
creation
of a powerful,
multi-functional
regional
government. Strong regional governments, they suggest,
can best undertake the tasks of integrating housing,
transportation, and jobs-and of allocating waste disposal
facilities and other noxious land uses-in a way that would
alleviate concentrated poverty in metropolitan America.
The reason that this reliance on centralization is so
problematic is that the prevailing conceptual framework
that now dominates
thinking about metropolitan
governance presents local governmental power as the
exercise of freedom and centralized decision making as the
exercise of coercion. The status quo in metropolitan
America-racial and class segregation, car-centered
transportation systems, ever-increasing suburban sprawlis widely associated with "what people want." In sharp
2. Books published in the 1990s include, for example, DAVID RUSK, INSIDE
GAME OUTsIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA (1999);
MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND
STABILITY (1997); ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA
(1994); and NEAL PEIRCE, CITISTATES: HoW URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A
COMPETITVE WORLD (1993).
3. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
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contrast, suburban residents treat the egalitarian and
integrationist goals that Poindexter seeks to accomplish
through centralization as efforts to revive policies-like
"forced busing"-that have been repudiated for a
generation. And suburban residents are not alone in their
distrust of centralized power. Many African-American
mayors of declining central cities have become equally
enamored of local power, preferring to run their cities in
their own way rather than submit to centralized control.
Moreover, it is not just federal or state mandates-or
judicial activism-that are routinely condemned as efforts
to force people to adopt policies that they would not choose
for themselves. Regional government is usually understood
as simply one more form that this centralized coercion
would take. As a result, "almost no one favors metropolitan
government," as Anthony Downs 4puts it, "except a few
political scientists and intellectuals."
I do not think that the best strategy to counteract this
picture is to try to convince people that centralization is in
fact a good idea. Instead, I think that those who share
Poindexter's goals-and I am one of them-need to develop
an alternative to centralization better than the status quo.
Doing so requires institutional imagination: it requires
creating a form of decentralization different from the one
now embraced by local government law yet equally
associated with the exercise of freedom. In my view, it is the
current definition of decentralization-not the idea of
decentralization itself-that has led to the inequities that
Poindexter seeks to correct.
This current definition is the product of dozens of legal
rules. Here I shall mention only two. Cities within the
metropolitan area have the power to design what their
community looks like, and, as everyone knows, many cities
have used this zoning power to exclude the kind of people
they consider "undesirable." This power is normally
accompanied by a second important legal power: the ability
of city residents to treat the property within their city limits
as their own property-as a resource that can be used to
support the people who live within city boundaries and no
one else. The reason that prosperous communities can
support their services in a much more lavish way than can
their poorer neighbors, in other words, is that they are
4. DOWNS, supranote 2, at 170.
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entitled to exclude the poor not only as residents but as
beneficiaries of public spending.
These two rules reflect a privatized definition of city
power. The reason that I call it privatized is that these
rules are derived from the legal rules that define private
property. The first power-the right to exclude
"undesirables"-is, in fact, often thought of as the very
essence of the property right.5 To have private property, it is
frequently said, means the ability to prevent uninvited
people from entering one's property-let alone moving in.
The second power-the basis of local finance-is equally
associated with the notion of private property. The idea that
you can treat the property located within the city
boundaries as a resource available only to city residents
analogizes it to property that is jointly owned by the
residents. That is why any suggestion that taxes raised on
the property located within a city's boundaries should be
spent elsewhere is so often experienced as the reallocation
of wealth. These property-based images have so powerfully
influenced the definition of city power that it is easy to
forget that the legal rules I am describing define an aspect
of governmental power, not the power of a private entitythey define what cities are and what they can do.
This privatized conception of city power has enabled
people to adopt another privatized conception of cities. This
is the notion that the way to think about where to live in a
metropolitan area is to shop for cities-in the same way
that one shops for any consumer good-by calculating how
much a particular package of city services costs in city
taxes.6 People who think in this way move to wealthy
communities, if they can afford to do so, because they
thereby save the money that they would have spent on the
poor had they remained in a class-integrated jurisdiction.
The reason they can avoid taxes paid by those they leave
behind, one should recognize, is that they can exclude the
poor though exclusionary zoning and limit their schools and
other services to city residents. As the wealthy move to
5. See Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374
(1954).
6. This conception is widely associated with Charles M. Tiebout's A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956), but the crucial
assumptions recognized by Tiebout when constructing his economic model (such
as equal access to mobility) are routinely omitted in the popular version of the
idea referred to here.
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their suburbs with this cost-consciousness in mind, taking
their resources with them, the cities they abandon begin to
decline. As a result, people in the middle class move to their
own suburbs and exclude those poorer than they are, and
the central cities decline even further. Ultimately, the
central cities-and the suburbs that Poindexter describes
where the poor also live-become very poor (although some
retain pockets of the rich living in their own isolated
neighborhoods). What I am describing here is a selfperpetuating cycle: the more the suburbs are built on the
ideas of private property and consumer choice, the more the
metropolitan area becomes divided into spaces readily
identifiable in terms of the income level of their
inhabitants.
This is the status quo that is so often described as
"what people want." In order to rethink the legal structure
that has helped bring this status quo into being we have to
recognize that it can also be understood as producing a
metropolitan landscape that people do not want.
Emphasizing the environmental problems caused by
suburban sprawl is the usual way this point is made these
days.' It is simplistic to assume, advocates of "smart
growth" contend, that those who are moving to the outer
suburbs are in favor of sprawl. On the contrary, they say,
people who are moving further and further from the central
city are actually seeking to escape sprawl rather than to
embrace it: what they want is being surrounded by nature,
not more strip malls and traffic jams. As a result, even
those who are contributing to sprawl by moving out can be
part of a constituency to end it. So can the farmers whose
land is threatened with development, as well as everyone
else in the region, wherever they live, who value the ability
to enjoy natural beauty unspoiled by development.
Moreover, this environmental argument only begins to
touch the problems generated by the incentives to exit
fostered by current legal rules. I have written elsewhere
about four other categories of metropolitan residents hurt
by suburban sprawl: women whose ability to combine their
professional and family life is frustrated by long commuting
time and lack of access to nearby child care; elderly people
7. See, e.g., <http://www.epa.gov/regionOl/ra/sprawl/sprawl.html> ("Smart
Growth Strategies for New England") (Nov. 8, 1999) (on file with the Buffalo
Law Review).
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who are prevented from remaining in their neighborhood
because zoning rules prohibit them from subdividing their
house to make room for family members or because the
decline of their neighborhood (or its gentrification) makes it
impossible to stay; residents of the vast areas of the
metropolitan area-central cities, middle-class suburbs,
and the poor suburbs that Poindexter describes-who are
hurt by the disinvestment produced when businesses follow
the wealthy to the outer suburbs; and middle-class AfricanAmericans, now living in their own suburbs, who are
increasingly isolated both from white suburban residents
and from the poor African-Americans they left behind.8
Many more kinds of people can be added to this list.
A revised local government law needs to be built upon
this variety of problems metropolitan residents now
experience with the status quo. That is why the second
ingredient in Poindexter's programmatic vision-her focus
solely on the problems of concentrated poverty-has to be
rejected. Instead of focusing solely on the effect of the status
quo on the poor, their problems should be understood as
simply one ingredient in the widespread difficulties caused
by the current metropolitan landscape. The Charter of the
Congress of the New Urbanism-a group of architects,
planners, and others interested in restoring urban centers
and reconfiguring the nature of suburban sprawl-has
made the interrelationship among the problems now facing
metropolitan residents a primary focus. "The Congress for
the New Urbanism views disinvestment in central cities,
the spread of placeless sprawl, increasing separation by
race and income, environmental deterioration, the loss of
agricultural lands and wilderness, and the erosion of the
society's built heritage as one interrelated communitybuilding challenge."9
Local government law needs to be reformulated so that
it too views these issues as one interrelated communitybuilding challenge. This does not require the centralization
of power. Even the metropolitan residents who recognize
the pervasive problems created by the status quo object to
centralization. Instead of the abolition of local power, what
8. See

GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING

COMMUNITIES

WITHOUT

BUILDING WALLS 154-164 (1999).

9. <http'//www.cnu.org.> (Nov. 8, 1999) (on file with the Buffalo Law
Review).
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is needed is a modification of the sprawl-generating
mechanism built into current law. No one thinks it
irrational for people to enrich themselves, if they can, by
adopting as their own the incentive system that local
government law now embraces. These individual decisions,
however, have had collective consequences that even those
who have been enriched by them do not like. These
undesirable consequences cross existing city borders, and
those affected by them-environmentalists, mothers
working outside the home, the elderly, residents of
declining cities, African-Americans, and the poor, among
many others-are themselves spread throughout the area.
Any attempt to bring this wide variety of people together to
solve the problems caused by unlimited suburban growth is
frustrated, however, by the "us versus them" mentality
built into the current privatized definition of city power. No
doubt, a conversation among the different kinds of people
disserved by current rules would generate a considerable
amount of conflict about how to change them. Still, the first
step is to begin the conversation.
I have written elsewhere about the kind of regional
institutions that might best facilitate such a conversation
and, thereby, promote a less privatized conception of the
decentralization of power." In this short comment, I simply
want to convince you that there is no reason to identify
centralization with the ability to solve inter-jurisdictional
problems and decentralization with the protection of local
selfishness. Historically, centralization has been a major
contributor to the promotion of local selfishness, and the
conventional definition of federalism is simply the most
familiar attempt to recognize that entities that exercise
decentralized power can together form an indivisible
union." An important aspect of any metropolitan-wide
discussion should be an enumeration of the decisions made
by centralized government that have contributed to
metropolitan fragmentation. By this I mean not only
highway funding and decisions about land use (such as the
failure to impose growth boundaries), but the definition of
city power adopted by state law. An equally important focus
10. See FRUG, supranote 8, at 85-89, 106-09.
11. The best analysis of the relationship between centralization and the
promotion of local separatism is in Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History
of Jurisdiction),97 MICH. L. REV. 843 (1999).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

should be an analysis of the ways in which current zoning
rules and financing rules have affected metropolitan
residents generally, not simply those who live in the areas
of concentrated poverty. Once this impact becomes well
understood, metropolitan residents can begin to explore
how current rules can be changed without abandoning the
decentralization of power. Zoning rules that recognize the
impact that exclusionary zoning imposes on outsiders can
still empower local people to make decisions about land use.
Financing rules that limit the preference that the current
system offers insiders-in a way similar to Commerce
Clause restrictions on local protectionism12-can retain,
even increase, local control over the delivery of services
such as education while remedying the scandalous
inequality that the current system generates. Because the
greatest problem now facing America's poor is their
isolation,' addressing the problems of concentrated poverty
requires breaking the connection between the concept of
decentralized power and the separation and division of the
metropolitan population. But the same observation should
be made about everyone else: the urban policy of separation
and division now embodied in local government law limits
the lives of everyone in America's metropolitan areas.

12. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
13. See, e.g., PAUL JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND
THE AMERICAN CITY 193 (1997).

